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Abstract 
In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law 
enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition 
policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature 
on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information 
structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an 
action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated 
by a Competition Authority.  We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision 
errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of 
legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate 
higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar 
finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in 
earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992).  Our second 
contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects-
Based legal standards.  In that analysis we considered just a single information structure 
under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed.  Here we 
allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b)  
endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information 
structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal 
penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal 
uncertainty.   
 
JEL: K4, L4, K21, K23 
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Introduction 
 
It is widely argued that, when deciding what type of procedures to use to enforce 
regulatory intervention in markets, an important consideration is the degree of legal 
uncertainty
4
  - the extent to which agents know, at the time they decide to take an action, 
what decision a regulatory authority will make as to whether to allow or disallow  (and 
possibly penalise) the agent’s action should it ever be investigated by the authority.  
Certain enforcement procedures are advocated in policy circles as being superior, ceteris 
paribus, because the legal uncertainty
5
 they generate is relatively low.   
While this issue is important for a very broad range of regulatory interventions
6
, we 
frame our discussion and analysis in the specific context of competition policy / law and 
its enforcement.  Here discussions on legal uncertainty usually involve comparisons of 
Effects-Based
7
 enforcement procedures and Per Se enforcement procedures
8
. Under Per 
Se an entire class of actions is allowed (resp. disallowed), depending on whether their 
average harm
9
 is negative (resp. positive), whereas under Effects-Based procedures, the 
Competition Authority (CA) will investigate actions, and allow (resp. disallow) them if 
some estimate of their individual harm is negative (resp. positive)
10
. It is argued that 
                                                
4
 Legal scholars and social scientists have, of course, discussed the issue of legal uncertainty in a much 
wider context than that of economic regulation. Among early prominent authors, Max Weber, thought of 
legal certainty as necessary for capitalist progress – see discussion in D’Amato (1983) with extensive 
references to legal scholars including Posner (8
th
 edition, 2010).  For a discussion of the importance of legal 
certainty by a EU competition law expert, see Forrester’s (2000) account in the context of Competition 
Policy.  In Section 2 we provide a review of the extensive Law and Economics (mainly US) literature that 
has examined over many years various implications of legal uncertainty for law enforcement.  
5
 Or, lack of ability to predict the outcome of a legal dispute. D’Amato (1983) defines “legal uncertainty” 
as a “situation that obtains when the (legal) rule that is relevant to a given act or transaction is said by 
informed attorneys to have an expected official outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability”. For a 
recent extensive treatment by a legal expert see Kevin E. Davis (2011).  
6
 As has been recognised in the Law and Economics literature reviewed in Section 2. These include 
interventions associated with the application of Environmental Policy, determining eligibility for welfare 
benefits, Tax Compliance mechanisms, as well as, Competition Policy, Sectoral Regulation, etc. 
7
 Sometimes alternatively called discriminating or Rule-of-Reason procedures.  One can think of what in 
US is termed Rule–of–Reason as an extreme form of the Effects-Based approach under which competition 
authorities have the discretion to apply different economic methodologies and criteria on a case-by-case 
basis. For this last distinction see also Vickers (2007). 
8
   Often also referred to as object or form-based procedures. 
9
 Usually it is “harm to others” that is the adopted criterion, or a consumer surplus substantive standard is 
used (see also below). 
10
  This distinction is similar to the comparison between unconditional/rigid and conditional/flexible 
contracts.  In the context of welfare policy there is an analogous distinction between universal and targeted 
benefits.  
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under a Per Se rule firms are certain how their action will be treated if it ever comes 
under scrutiny by a CA, whereas, under an Effects-Based approach, they do not know for 
sure what decision would be taken, and consequently this legal uncertainty induced by 
Effects –Based procedures should lead the CA to favour Per Se procedures. For example, 
in his classic article, after reviewing all the reasons why it is hard to have clarity as to the 
circumstances under which an action may in principle be harmful or benign, and the 
difficulties of obtaining data and carrying out the calculations required to implement 
whatever tests might be available, Easterbrook (1992) writes “Do we then abandon 
antitrust? Hardly! We should instead use more widely the method we apply to cartels: per 
se rules based on ordinary effects disdaining the search for rare counter-examples.”
11
  
The issue of legal uncertainty has attracted attention in recent years for another 
reason. Thus, legal experts have stressed that the increased tendency to use Effects-based 
procedures should have been associated with a reduction in the level (or even removal) of 
fines imposed, though the reverse has been the case. Thus Dethmers and Engelen (2011) 
note that “the European Commission recently imposed a record fine of 1.06 billion euro 
on Intel for having abused its dominant position by employing conditional rebates…. 
despite the adoption by the Commission of a more effects-based approach under art. 102 
(TFEU)
12
” The authors go on to argue that from a legal perspective the imposition of 
fines requires that “the Commission and courts must present evidence of intent or 
negligence in accordance with the principle of nulla poena sine lege certa
13
. In terms of 
policy it does not make sense to impose such high fines for anti-competitive behaviors, 
which are not per se illegal…”
14
. 
                                                
11
 The issue has gained even more in importance recently as CAs worldwide have adopted significant 
reforms in decision and enforcement procedures, with an increasing use of Effects-Based rather than Per Se 
procedures.  Examples include the adoption of a Rule-of-Reason standard for treating RPM in US, in the 
recent Leegin case (2007) – see for a discussion, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) – and the reforms in the 
assessment of article 102 practices by EU and national authorities (see the Commission Guidance Paper, 
2008).  These have followed earlier reforms adopting Effects-Based assessment procedures in merger, 
vertical and certain horizontal agreement cases. See also Katsoulacos and Ulph (2011a), Kokkoris and 
Lianos (2008), Will and Schmidtchen (2008). 
12
 Very high fines were imposed also in Microsoft and other recent cases – see for a review p. 86 – 89 of 
Dethmers and Engelen (2011). As the authors also note “The courts do not appear to impose any constraint 
on the Commission’s discretion” to impose very high fines – p. 91.  
13
 This Latin phrase may be translated as “no penalty unless there is certainty under the Law”. 
14
 Ibid. p. 98. 
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In this paper we first propose a formalisation to the concept of legal uncertainty. 
This is explained and related to the existing literature in Section 2. Then we extend and 
generalise significantly our previous analysis Katsoulacos and Ulph (K&U, 2009)
15
 in 
which we undertook an welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects-Based legal standards, 
assuming, for the latter case, a specific information structure that we now call Partial 
Legal Uncertainty. In addition in K&U (2009) we assumed fixed penalties. Here we 
allow for different information structures under Effects-Based procedures – namely what 
we will call No Legal Uncertainty, Partial Legal Uncertainty and Complete Legal 
Uncertainty - and also we allow the competition authority to adjust penalties depending 
on both the legal standard that is employed and the information structure that prevails.
16
   
The model is set out in Section 3. In Section 4 we establish the welfare levels under the 
different information structures and in Section 5 we establish our main results. In 
summary, these are as follows.   
1. Generally
17
 when firms know whether their actions are harmful or benign but are 
uncertain about the CA’s potential assessment of these actions (so there is what 
we call Partial Legal Uncertainty), welfare may be higher than when firms face 
no legal uncertainty (Proposition 2). This is certainly the case with optimal 
endogenously set penalties (Proposition 5a). This result echoes a similar finding 
obtained in a completely different context and different assumptions in the earlier 
Law and Economics literature by Kaplow and Shavell (1992).   
2. Turning to a comparison of Effects-Based to Per Se legal standards, we find that 
with exogenously fixed penalties, Effects-Based welfare dominates Per Se when 
in the former there is No Legal Uncertainty (Proposition 1) and may dominate Per 
Se when in the former there is Partial Legal Uncertainty (Corollary 2 of 
Proposition 2).  This last result is the result of K&U (2009). The intuition is that 
under Partial Legal Uncertainty there is a differential deterrence effect - the 
fraction of harmful actions deterred is greater than that of benign actions - and the 
                                                
15
 See also Kwak (2010) that deals with related issues to those discussed here, concerning judicial errors 
and the choice of the liability standard. 
16
 As in Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009), we ignore the potential cost advantage of decision-making under Per 
Se as compared to Effects-Based rules as an additional factor favouring Per Se.  This is readily incorporated 
and we have no new insights to offer on this issue. See Christiansen, A. and W. Kerber. (2008). 
17
 That is under both exogenous and optimal (endogenously set) penalties 
5 
 
conclusion will hold when this effect is strong enough. We further establish that 
under an Effects-Based legal standard, No Legal Uncertainty and Partial Legal 
Uncertainty welfare dominate Complete Legal Uncertainty (Propositions 3 and 4). 
3. With optimally set endogenous penalties, we show that there is an unambiguous 
welfare ranking of legal standards and information structures.  For a given 
Effects-Based procedure, welfare is higher when there is Partial Legal 
Uncertainty than it is with No Legal Uncertainty that is in turn higher than when 
there is Complete Legal Uncertainty
18
. Further the latter is welfare equivalent to  a 
Per Se legal standard (Proposition 5a and 5b). 
4. Under an Effects-Based procedure the penalty chosen by the CA when there is 
Partial Legal Uncertainty will be higher than when there is No Legal Uncertainty 
and also higher than under the corresponding Per Se standard (Proposition 6a and 
6d). The intuition is that legal uncertainty reduces the anticipated likelihood that 
an action will be disallowed and, to compensate for this and establish the desired 
deterrence level, the CA has to increase the level of penalties.   
5. When there is Complete Legal Uncertainty then, if the action is Presumptively 
Illegal the Competition Authority will want to deter all actions which, for the 
reasons given above, requires a higher penalty than under Partial Legal 
Uncertainty (Propositions 6b and 6c)
19
. However, if the action is Presumptively 
Legal,  the Competition Authority will set a zero penalty.  Thus we find limited 
support for the legal principle of nulla poena sine lega certa. 
 
  
                                                
18
 As explained below, Complete Legal Uncertainty is the situation where both of the potential dimensions 
of uncertainty are present: firms do not know the true type of their actions and are also uncertain about how 
an error-prone authority will assess these actions were they to be detected and investigated. 
19
 These results on optimal penalties are entirely consistent with the Beckerian tradition (Becker, 1968) as 
we discuss in Section 5. 
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1. Formalising the Concept of Legal Uncertainty: Brief Review of and 
Relation to Existing Literature 
 
While one legal expert has noted that there is an “absence of rigorously defined 
yet practical measures of legal uncertainty”
20
, the concept, loosely defined as the lack of 
ability to predict the outcome of a legal dispute, has been subject to extensive discussion 
by economists and legal experts.  Calfee and Craswell (1984) offer an excellent informal 
review of early contributions, and, in a follow-up article – Craswell and Calfee (1986) - 
provide more formal analysis. They stress two potential sources of legal uncertainty.   
The first is uncertainty regarding the liability standard which we can think of as 
the threshold level of harm caused by an action such that if the authority perceives the 
harm caused by a firm’s action to be above this threshold it will disallow and penalise the 
action, while if the perceived level of harm is below this threshold then the authority will 
allow the firm’s action.   
The second source of legal uncertainty, which has since received much more 
extensive attention in the literature
21
, arises because authorities are unable to determine 
the actual harm caused by an action and so have to form some estimate of the harm, and 
an action is disallowed if the estimated value of harm is above the liability standard.  
Since these estimates contain errors this gives rise to possible Type I and Type II decision 
errors whereby actions that should be allowed are disallowed and actions that should be 
disallowed are allowed.   
 In their analyses, Craswell and Calfee (1984, 1986) examine welfare implications 
of the above considering more specifically how under-compliance and over-compliance 
are affected.
22
 In line with this reasoning, assume that the decision rule used by the 
authority is to set liability standard h  and then disapprove the action taken by firm k iff   
    e
k
h h>  
                                                
20
 Davis (2011), p. 1.     
21
 For example, in the context of competition policy, Schinkel, M.P. and J. Tuinstra, (2006), Kwak  J (2010) 
and Lang M (2012),  Also, in the context of the more general Law and Economics literature, see references 
mentioned below. 
22
 More recent analyses of the impact of errors have been undertaken by Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) and 
by Lang (2012). 
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where 
 
h
k
e
 denotes the authority’s estimate of the harm caused by firm k. Now, in 
principle, the liability standard may be positive negative or zero. While below we could 
permit the possibility that firms do not know the liability standard, since we are going to 
allow the possibility that one of the reasons why they may not know for sure what 
decision the authority will make in their case is that they don’t know what estimate of 
harm the authority will make, and since the decision rule depends simply on the 
difference between the estimate of harm and the liability standard, it will simplify the 
analysis if we assume that firms know the liability standard, and, furthermore that this is 
normalised so that 0h = . 
Following Craswell and Calfee (1984, 1986), many papers in the Law and 
Economics literature have used models in which, as in our model below, agents that 
undertake privately beneficial but socially harmful actions can face uncertainty along two 
dimensions, specifically, either (a) because they do not know whether their actions are or 
are not harmful or/and (b) because they do not know how their actions will be treated by 
a social authority, the decisions of which are subject to errors. If actions are detected and, 
following an investigation, are found harmful they are subject to sanctions, also as in our 
model below. This literature includes the important papers by Kaplow (1990), Kaplow 
(1995) and Kaplow and Shavell (1992). Kaplow (1990) examines the issue of optimal 
sanctions on agents that may be uncertain about whether their actions are harmful and 
thus sanctionable, though they may become perfectly informed at a positive cost. 
Specifically, the paper addresses three questions: if sanctions can be differentiated, is 
their optimal level the same for informed and uninformed agents? If sanctions must be 
the same, is the value of the optimal sanction affected by the presence of uninformed 
agents? And, when is it efficient for a tribunal to undertake the cost required in order to 
apply differential sanctions? Kaplow (1995) uses a similar setting, but with actions 
differing in their level of harm and examines the issue of whether it is welfare improving 
for a tribunal to undertake the cost of differentiating between actions of different harm by 
using more complex legal rules and setting different sanctions depending on the harm. 
Kaplow and Shavell (1992) uses a model closer in spirit than all other models in the 
literature to the model below in the sense that agents face uncertainty because they may 
not know their true type or because of errors made in determining true harm by the social 
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authority. Agents can obtain legal advice in order to eliminate both of these sources of 
uncertainty and the analysis examines whether the demand for such advice is socially 
appropriate. The analysis, although dealing with an issue (the demand for legal advice) 
completely different from the issues we are concerned with here and although, in most 
important respects, it utilises very different assumptions to those we utilise (see 
immediately below and Section 3 where we interpret Kaplow and Shavell (1992) in terms 
of our framework), it leads to a result that seems to be an early precedent to one of the 
results also established below, namely that legal uncertainty may be welfare improving - 
Kaplow and Shavell (1992), Proposition 3
23
.  
There are very important differences between all the above papers and the present 
paper
24
.  
• In these papers the substantive standard used by the social authority for assessing 
whether an action is illegal is that of total welfare while we assume, as is much more 
natural in the context of competition law enforcement
25
, that the standard is that of 
consumer welfare. This is important given that the standard used influences in a 
critical way the deterrence objectives of the social authority and optimal penalties.  
• Kaplow (1990 and 1995) incorporate only one of the main dimensions of legal 
uncertainty – that related to agents not knowing their type.  
                                                
23
 Hylton (1990), extending Ordover (1978), could also be considered an early predecessor in the literature 
on enforcement errors and uncertainty – see footnote 23. 
24
 In addition to the differences between our paper and the earlier literature that are discussed below in the 
main text, the papers by Hylton and Ordover differ from ours in the crucial respect that they relate to 
another strand in the Law and Economics literature that deals with important private litigation issues, which 
we do not consider here.  The main source of uncertainty in their analysis is that  individuals do not know 
the extent to which other people are negligent,  though they know the average degree of negligence. Thus 
Ordover (1978) examines the implications of costly litigation for compliance in these contexts while 
Hylton (1990) extends the Ordover analysis by introducing judicial errors in assessing negligence.  These 
errors make it possible to achieve perfect compliance equilibria – something that cannot happen in 
Ordover’s framework – and so can, in this sense, be thought of as increasing welfare. However, one of the 
major contributions of this paper is to make it clear that – contrary to much of the Law and Economics 
literature mentioned in the text -  (i) Legal Uncertainty and judicial errors are two logically distinct 
phenomena, and (ii)  the existence of  judicial errors  is neither neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
existence of Legal Uncertainty.  Consequently there is an important difference between Hylton’s finding 
and one of our main findings – the welfare-enhancing effects of Legal Uncertainty.   
25
 It is standard practice for CAs to use a consumer surplus substantive standard – see Salop (2010), though, 
among economists, there are strong voices in favour of a total welfare standard (e.g. Carlton, 2007). 
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• While Kaplow (1990) deals specifically with optimal sanctions, it is essentially 
assumed that there is a fixed penalty the optimal value of which is related to harm
26
, 
whereas we use a more general sanction structure that allows for both a penalty that is 
proportional to the private gain and a fixed part, to capture, respectively, both 
deterrence objectives and the objective to penalise the firm for the social harm its 
action causes.  Such a penalty  structure also reflects fining procedures in competition 
policy practice.   
• All three papers conflate the probability of being found illegal into a single number 
while it is important for our analysis to take explicitly into account that this 
probability is the product of two distinct probabilities:  the probability of being 
investigated by an authority; and the probability that, if investigated, the authority, 
making decisions subject to errors, actually decides that the action is harmful and 
imposes a penalty.    
• In the context of the issues addressed by all the above papers, it may be natural to 
assume, as they do, that all potential actions considered by the authority are non-
benign
27
.  Thus it is implicitly assumed that all benign actions are condoned and 
consequently that there are no Type I errors.
28
   However this is certainly not the case 
for the sort of business practices dealt with by Competition Law, so below in our 
framework we have to allow for actions that are either socially harmful or socially 
benign and to allow the authority’s decision errors to extend to its assessment of the 
latter type of actions
29
.  
Here we propose what we call the information structure approach to the 
formalisation of legal uncertainty. An information structure specifies the probability that 
                                                
26
 Note that interactions between the various differences in the assumptions mentioned here can also affect 
the results: e.g. it is easy to show that in Kaplow (1990), with a more general penalty structure the optimal 
structure depends on whether a total welfare or a consumer surplus substantive standard is assumed.  
27
 That is, they generate positive or zero (but not negative) harm.  
28
 An alternative way to put this is to say that Kaplow (1990) just deals with actions that in the terminology 
below, are presumptively illegal while we also have to consider presumptively legal actions. This also has 
serious implications for the results we get on optimal penalties under the different information structures.  
29
 An additional difference between the above papers and the present one is that we examine the important 
phenomenon of desistance, i.e. how delays in the authority’s procedures affects the outcomes.  Agents’ 
anti-competitive actions will normally take some time before they create benefits and social harm and so 
the size of these accruing will depend critically on delays in the authority’s procedures, which therefore 
will affect the value of optimal sanctions (see also, Katsoulacos and Ulph, 2013).  
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each agent attaches - at the time they take an action – to the possibility that, were the CA 
to investigate this action, it would deem it to be harmful (and impose a sanction).  The 
approach also involves specifying the number of different information structures that 
could arise and how/why individual agents’ probabilities vary across them.  
While this  approach is closely related to the main ideas introduced in the 
different strands of the literature above concerning the nature and sources of legal 
uncertainty, it also clarifies why it is very important to distinguish the phenomenon of 
legal uncertainty from the Type I and Type II decision errors made by competition 
authorities.  In particular, we show that the existence of decision errors made by the 
authority are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty.  
Now, firms’ perceived probability of having their actions deemed anti-
competitive will depend on: 
(i) Whether or not they know the true harm (positive or negative) caused by 
their action
30
. 
(ii) Whether or not they know the estimate that will be made by the authority 
the harm caused by their action (which depends on their understanding of 
exactly how the authority reaches its estimates of harm). 
(iii) Whether or not they know the liability standard that the authority is using.  
Assuming, as already noted, that the authority uses a zero-harm liability standard 
and that this is common knowledge, we can distinguish the following three information 
structures
31
: 
I. No Legal Uncertainty (NLU): here, at the time they take their action, all 
firms know for certain the estimate of harm that the authority will make in 
their case
32
, should it ever be investigated.  In particular this is true 
irrespective of whether or not firms know the true harm of their action.   
However decision errors made by the authority imply that some benign 
actions will be falsely convicted (Type I errors) and some harmful actions will 
be falsely acquitted (Type-II errors).  So, with No Legal Uncertainty, firms of 
                                                
30
 That is whether or not their type 
31
 We indicate below how the analysis of Kaplow and Shavell (1992) can be interpreted in terms of these.  
32
 This could arise if the CA set out the factors it would measure, the data it would use to measure these, 
and the calculations it would make, and if firms could costlessly access exactly the data the CA would use 
in its particular case and perform the calculations before it decided to take the action. 
11 
 
different type may face the same probabilities of being convicted or not 
convicted. While, in certain contexts, this information structure will be 
unrealistic, nevertheless it serves as a useful benchmark for making the point  
that the use of an Effects-Based procedure that makes both Type I and Type II 
decision errors does NOT entail the existence of legal uncertainty.  Put 
differently, one should not confuse variability of decisions across otherwise 
identical firms with legal uncertainty about the decision that will be reached 
in a specific case.   
II. Partial Legal Uncertainty (PLU): here all firms know their true type but 
have an imperfect understanding of exactly how the authority reaches its 
estimates of harm and thus do not know for certain the estimate of harm that 
the authority will make in their case. However firms are assumed to know 
probability of the authority’s making Type I and Type II errors
33
 and, knowin 
their own type,  this allows each firm to calculate the probability of being 
convicted if investigated. This information structure is distinguished by two 
features: 
a) All firms of the same type perceive the same probability of being 
convicted. 
b) This probability varies with firms’ type, being monotonic with the harm 
caused by the action to others.  
As we will see, these features generate differential deterrence effects and, with 
optimal penalties, the authority can then deter all harmful actions.  
III. Complete Legal Uncertainty (CLU): here firms know neither the true harm 
caused by their action nor the estimate of harm that the authority will make in 
their case. In this case firms’ perceived probability of their action being found 
illegal and a penalty imposed, is assumed to be the average probability of 
conviction
34
. Notice that this case can arise even if the authority makes no 
decision errors.   
                                                
33
 We make this assumption because we do no want to confuse mis-perceptions that could arise for many 
factors with legal uncertainty which arises from imperfect information about how authorities make their 
decisions. 
34
 Once again we make this assumption to avoid confusion with other sources of mis-perception. 
12 
 
          So in our framework legal uncertainty relates solely to what firms know about the 
decision that will be made should their action be investigated under a given decision 
procedure used by the CA.  Since the decision rule is fixed, so too are the associated costs 
of the Type I and Type II errors to which it gives rise, and the different information 
structures matter solely because of the different deterrence effects that they generate due 
to the different perceived probabilities of conviction to which they give rise.  A number 
of additional remarks are likely to be useful. 
If there is No Legal Uncertainty the competition authority does not exploit any of 
the information that the firms know about the harm caused by their action, so, amongst 
firms who will be convicted, those whose actions are more harmful perceive no greater 
probability of conviction than those whose actions are less harmful.  Similarly amongst 
firms whose actions will not be convicted. So, in that sense, there is no differential 
deterrence effect. While there is some statistical sense in which there is a differential 
deterrence effect at work – on average actions which are more harmful will be more 
likely to be deterred than actions that are less harmful, this does not happen at the level of 
individual firms. 
With Partial Legal Uncertainty, on the other hand, there is a strong differential 
deterrence effect since all firms whose actions are more harmful will face a higher 
probability of conviction than those whose actions are less harmful. Finally, under 
Complete Legal Uncertainty there is absolutely no differential deterrence effect since all 
firms perceive exactly the same probability of conviction.  As we show these generate 
important welfare consequences.  
2. Basic Set Up - Modelling Legal Uncertainty 
 
Preliminaries 
There is a population of firms of size 1 that could take a particular type of action – 
which is potentially prohibited under Competition Law.  We assume that this action has a 
natural life, and normalise the length of this natural life to 1.  
 A fraction , 0 1γ γ< <  of firms taking this action come from a Harmful 
environment so, if they take the action, this generates a social harm that is measured by 
13 
 
the negative of the change in consumers’ surplus, and denoted by 0
H
h >
35
. The 
remaining fraction come from a Benign environment, so, if they take the action, this 
generates harm that we denote by 0
B
h < . Let (1 )
H B
h h hγ γ= + −  be the average harm for 
this type of action. The type of action is said to be Presumptively Legal (resp.  Illegal)  if 
( )0 resp.  0h h< > . We assume that γ is common knowledge. 
In the absence of any intervention by the CA, taking an action will confer a 
private benefit b > 0 for the firm
36
. The distribution of b is independent of the 
environment from which the firm comes
37
. We suppose that the private benefit has a 
positive continuous probability density ( ) 0f b > on [0, )∞  with cumulative distribution 
function given by ( ), 0 ( ) 1; ( ) ( ) 0F b F b F b f b′< < = > .  
 
Competition Authority Decision Procedures 
There is a CA that detects and initiates enforcement procedures against a fraction 
, 0 1π π< ≤  of the actions taken.  We refer to π as the coverage rate.   
These enforcement procedures include verifying that a potentially anti-
competitive action has been taken by the firm and, in the case of an Effects-Based 
standard, carrying out an investigation into its potential harm.  If, under either a Per Se or 
an Effects-Based procedure an action is deemed harmful, then, the CA imposes a penalty, 
and, in common with virtually all the literature on optimal penalties, we assume that this 
penalty is imposed immediately after the action has reached its natural life.
38
  
                                                
35
 As noted above, this is the substantive standard used by most Competition Authorities – see Motta 
(2004) or O’Donohue & Padilla (2007) - and employed in our previous paper – Katsoulacos & Ulph 
(2009).  It is the standard advocated by Salop (2010) This differs from a total welfare standard that would 
include the private benefit to the firm taking the action – advocated by Carlton (2007). 
36
 Which we take to be the present value of the expected change in profits from the action over its ‘natural’ 
lifetime. 
37
 The “symmetry” assumption - see Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), in which we also discuss the 
implications of relaxing this assumption. 
38
 In Katsoulacos & Ulph (2013) we explore the implications of allowing for the possibilities that the CA 
might make its decision either before the action has reached its natural life or long after it has done so.  In 
the former case the CA will order the firm to cease the action and the loss of all subsequent profits will 
itself be a penalty for taking the action.  Consequently the optimal penalty will be lower.  In the latter case 
the delay in imposing the penalty will, through discounting, make the penalty seem small relative to 
anticipate profits, and so necessitate a higher optimal penalty.  In an electronic version of this paper, 
Katsoulacos & Ulph (2014) we develop the analysis that follows in a much more general setting that allows 
for the possibility that a CA might investigate an action and, if it is deemed harmful, terminate it before it 
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As mentioned, we assume that the CA uses a liability standard 0h = , and can use 
one of two decision procedures. 
Per Se   Here the CA allows all actions of a given type if that type is  
Presumptively Legal and disallows all actions if the type is Presumptively Illegal. 
Consequently, for any given type of action, only one type of decision error is made by the 
CA:  Type I (False Convictions) if the type of action is Presumptively Illegal and Type II 
(False Acquittals) if it is Presumptively Legal.  
  Effects-Based   Under this procedure the CA undertakes an investigation of each 
action that comes before it, as a result of which it gets an estimate or a signal of the likely 
harm caused by the action.  This signal, which is only imperfectly correlated with the true 
harm, will be either: “Positive Harm” indicating that on the basis of the evidence 
obtained the CA thinks the action is likely to reduce welfare; or  “Negative Harm”,  
indicating that the action is likely to increase welfare.  The CA’s decision rule is to 
disallow an action if it gets a Positive Harm signal and allow it if it gets a Negative Harm 
signal.  
The quality of the CA’s model for estimating harm is embodied in the parameters 
, 0 1
B B
p p< <  - the probability that a Benign action generates a Negative Harm signal - 
and , 0 1
H H
p p< < - the probability that a Harmful action generates a Positive Harm 
signal.   We assume that the model used by the CA has some discriminatory power so 
that 1
B H
p p+ > , so firms from the Harmful environment are more likely to generate a 
Positive Harm signal than are firms from the Benign environment, and vice versa.    
We are interested in the question of whether legal uncertainty would ever be a 
reason for preferring a Per Se procedure to an Effects-Based one in situations where there 
was a prima facie reason to prefer to use Effects-Based, and we take that prima facie 
reason to be that the Effects-Based procedure has lower decision error costs
39
 than Per 
Se. In Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009) we establish the condition for this to be true. 
Consequently in all that follows we assume:   
                                                                                                                                            
has reached its natural life.  So actiosn can be stopped through both desistance and deterrence.  All our 
major conclusions go through in this more general setting. 
39
 In Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009) we say that in this case the Effects-Based model can effectively 
discriminate. 
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ASSUMPTION 1 Effects-Based Procedure Has Lower Decision-Error Costs 
(i) If  the action is Presumptively Legal – so (1 ) 0
H B
h h hγ γ= + − < -  then: 
( )( )1
1
1
BH
B H
hp
p h
γ
γ
− −
> >
−
   (1) 
(ii) If  the action is Presumptively Illegal – so (1 ) 0
H B
h h hγ γ= + − >  - then: 
( )( )
1
1 1
B H
H B
p h
p h
γ
γ
> >
− − −
   (2) 
 Assumption 1(i) guarantees that the average welfare of the actions that are 
disallowed will be negative, while 1(ii) guarantees that the average welfare of actions that 
are allowed is positive.  It is straightforward to show that if an action is Presumptively 
Legal then (1) implies (2), while if it is Presumptively Illegal then (2) implies (1).   So 
from now on we assume that both (1) and (2) hold.  
 
Characterization of Information Structures  
We assume that firms know whether the CA is using a Per Se or an Effects-Based 
procedure, and that, if it is Per Se, whether it is Per Se Legal or Per Se Illegal. When an 
Effects-Based procedure is used, then, consistent with our assumption in Section 2 above, 
that the distribution of errors is known we make the assumption:  
ASSUMPTION 2   All firms know the parameters ,
B H
p p .  Further, as 
mentioned, we assume that firms know the liability standard, 0h =  
For simplicity, in what follows we make the following additional assumption, 
though almost all our results go through without it
40
. 
ASSUMPTION 3  All firms face exactly the same type of legal uncertainty. 
We can then characterise the three information structures identified in Section 2 
above as follows.   
                                                
40
 More precisely, if there were fixed but unknown fractions of firms facing different types of legal 
uncertainty, and if these were random subsets of the population of firms, then the welfare rankings of legal 
standards and of information structures that we derive in Section 4 will go through.  The only result that 
would change would be that the CA would set just one level of penalty – that which applies when there is 
what we call Complete Legal Uncertainty.    
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• No Legal Uncertainty. As explained in Section 2, here firms know what decision 
the authority will take in their case.  So a fraction 
H
p  of firms from the Harmful 
environment will know for sure that their action will be disallowed, while the 
remaining fraction know for sure that it will be allowed.  Similarly a fraction 
B
p  
of firms from the Benign environment will know for sure that their action will be 
allowed, while the remaining fraction know for sure that it will be disallowed. As 
already noted, here there is no legal uncertainty though there are decision errors.  
• Partial Legal Uncertainty. Here firms know whether their actions are truly 
harmful or truly benign.  However, at the time they decide whether or not to take 
the action, they do not know what estimate of harm the CA will make in their 
particular case.  Instead a firm from the Harmful environment knows that there is 
a probability 
H
p  of having its action disallowed, while a firm from the Benign 
environment knows that there is a probability 
B
p  of having its action allowed.  
• Complete Legal Uncertainty.  Here firms do not know how harmful their action is, nor 
what view the authority will take of how harmful it is.  We assume that the uncertainty is 
so great that all that firms know is just the average probability of conviction,  
( )(1 ). 1H Bp p pγ γ= + − − .   
Interpreting Kaplow and Shavell (1992) 
As mentioned above, in Kaplow and Shavell’s (1992) set-up agents also either do not 
know whether their action is harmful or are uncertain about the authority’s error-prone decisions 
were their action to be investigated.  Using their terminology, agents can be “uninformed” 
because of either of these types of uncertainty. They can eliminate the uncertainty and become 
“informed” by getting “legal advice” at a cost. The paper examines whether the demand for legal 
advice is optimal. In terms of the framework used here, we can say that in Section 2 of their 
paper, agents’ information structure is one of Complete Legal Uncertainty
41
 and by getting legal 
advice they move to No Legal Uncertainty. In Section 3, agents’ information structure is one of 
Partial Legal Uncertainty and by getting legal advice they move to No Legal Uncertainty. 
Proposition 3 (in their Section 3) essentially establishes that getting legal advice and moving from 
Partial to No Legal Uncertainty is not socially optimal – removing uncertainty reduces welfare. 
                                                
41
 In this section, agents can be uninformed about whether their action is harmful and if they become 
informed they learn the true harm that is what the authority will determine if it undertakes an investigation.  
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As we noted above (Section 2), this result is established on the basis of a completely different set 
of assumptions to those utilised in this paper
42
. Further, here we are also primarily concerned, 
unlike Kaplow and Shavell (1992), with a comparison between different enforcement 
procedures
43
.  With respect to this note that, while, as in Section 2 of Kaplow and Shavell (1992) 
we find that moving from Complete to No Legal Uncertainty reduces welfare, we also show the 
important result that moving from an Effects-Based procedure with Complete Legal Uncertainty 
to a Per Se procedure can also reduce welfare.  
Fines 
In general fines can take the form of a fixed penalty plus a component that is 
proportional to the private benefit that is obtained by the firm
 44
.  The fixed component 
reflects the desire to link the penalty to the social harm that an anti-competitive action 
causes, while the proportional component reflects the desire to create deterrence by 
reducing the private benefit of firms gain by acting anti-competitively. Formally, we 
assume that if a firm with private benefit 0b >  has its action deemed anti-competitive it 
faces a penalty , 0, 0bψ ϕ ψ ϕ+ ≥ ≥ . The parameter pair ( ),ψ ϕ characterise a penalty 
regime.  
    
Behaviour of Firms 
Clearly if a firm knows for sure that, if investigated, its action will be allowed by 
the CA, penalties are irrelevant, and it will take the action whatever the penalty regime.   
Consider then a firm that anticipates some positive probability , 0 1β β< ≤  of 
having its action banned/disallowed by the CA should it ever be investigated.  Since it 
anticipates a probability , 0 1π π< <  of being investigated its expected net benefit from 
taking the action is  
    ( )1b βπϕ βπψ− − ,     (3) 
                                                
42
 As explained in Section 2 above, the different issues examined in the two papers – demand for legal 
advice in Kaplow and Shavell (1992) vs. optimal competition policy enforcement procedures here - can be 
considered as responsible for the differences in the assumptions.  
43
 And not just with a comparison across information structures. While comparing different enforcement 
procedures was the subject also of K&U (2009), as noticed above, in that paper the analysis was restricted 
to one information structure and only exogenous penalties.  
44
 There is an extensive literature on fines and law enforcement – see in particular the survey of Polinsky 
and Shavell (2000). For treatments that address fines under antitrust law see Buccirossi and Spangolo 
(2006), Wils (2006) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013). 
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which we can write as 
    
1
bβπ ϕ ψ
βπ
  
− −  
  
     (4) 
.   There are then two cases.  If: 
(i)  
1
ϕ
βπ
≥ ,  the firm cannot make a profit by taking the action, whatever the 
value of b  and  ψ;  
(ii) 
1
ϕ
βπ
<   then taking the action is profitable for all values of 
0
1
b
ψ
ϕ
βπ
> ≥
 
− 
 
45
. 
  
Taking these together, we see that for a group of firms facing a given penalty regime 
( ),ψ ϕ  and having the same anticipated probability , 0 1β β≤ ≤  of having their action 
disallowed by the CA, the fraction, D,  of  such firms deterred from taking the action is: 
( )
1
      if  
1
, ,
1
1                            if  
F
D
ψ
ϕ
βπ
ϕβ ϕ ψ
βπ
ϕ
βπ
  
  
   <
   
−=    
  

≥

  (5) 
As we will see, it turns out that if the CA can choose the penalty, it will want to 
deter either all or none of the firms from such a group.  We assume that, in the interests 
of proportionality, it will want to use the lowest penalty that achieves its objectives and 
so, in those ciecumstances where it wants to deter all firms it will set  
1
  and  0ϕ ψ
βπ
= = , whereas, when it wants to deter none it will set  0  and  0ϕ ψ= = .  
So, given our assumptions, the CA can achieve its objectives by using penalties that are 
                                                
45
 Notice also that the case where the action will certainly be allowed - 0β =  - is just a special case 
of the above analysis and generates the conclusion that the action will always be taken. 
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purely proportional to private benefit.  The dependence of the critical value of the 
penalty on the probability of an action’s being disallowed means that the penalty chosen 
will vary depending on both the legal standard in force and the information structure – 
the type of legal uncertainty.   
 
3. Outcomes Under Different Enforcement Procedures and 
Different Information Structures 
In this section we set out the levels of welfare under different enforcement 
procedures and, in the case of an Effects-Based procedure, under different information 
structures. We do this for both the case where penalties are exogenous and the case where 
the CA chooses the optimal level of penalty.  
 
4.1 Effects-Based Procedure 
In this sub-section we assume that the CA uses an Effects-Based procedure, and 
that this has lower decision error costs than under the appropriate Per Se procedure, so 
both (1) and (2) hold.  We consider in turn different information structures.  
 
4.1.1 No Legal Uncertainty 
Here a fraction ( )  resp.  1B Hp p−  of firms from the Benign (resp. Harmful) 
environment know for sure that their action will be allowed and so will take it 
irrespective of the penalty.  The remaining firms from each environment know for sure 
that, if investigated, their action will be disallowed, albeit after a delay.  Since private 
benefit is uncorrelated with harm, then, for any given penalty, the same fraction    
   0
1
      if  
1
1
1                            if  
EB
F
D
ψ
ϕ
πϕ
π
ϕ
π
  
  
<  
  −= 
 

≥
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of these firms will be deterred from taking the action.  Of those that do take the action, 
harm will arise to the extent that only a fraction will be investigate  Consequently welfare 
under a given penalty is: 
  
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ){ }
0
0
(1 ) 1
1 (1 ) 1
EB
B B H H
EB
H H B B
W h p h p
D h p h p
γ γ
γ γ
= − − − − −
− − − − −
  (6) 
The first term captures the welfare arising from those who know for sure that their 
action will be deemed benign, while the second is the expected welfare arising from those 
who know for sure that their action will be deemed harmful. Since the CA’s rule is 
assumed to be able to effectively discriminate, actions that are allowed will on average be 
beneficial while those that are disallowed will on average be harmful.  Hence, from (1) 
and (2), both the expressions in curly brackets are positive.  
This implies that if the CA could choose the penalty, it would like to deter all those 
firms who know for sure their action will be disallowed from taking it, so it would set a 
penalty  
   0 0
1
ˆ ˆ, 0
EB EBϕ ψ
π
= = ,     (7) 
giving rise to welfare: 
  ( ) ( )0ˆ (1 ) 1 0EB B B H HW h p h pγ γ= − − − − > .   (8) 
 
4.1.2 Partial Legal Uncertainty 
Here, while no firm knows for sure whether their action will be allowed or 
disallowed, firms know the liability standard and so know for sure whether their action is 
Harmful or Benign. Firms from the Harmful environment anticipate that, if investigated, 
there is a probability, 
H
p  of having their action deemed illegal and a penalty’s being 
imposed, whereas firms from the Benign environment anticipate a lower probability 
1
B H
p p− <  of an unfavourable decision by the CA. The fraction of firms from the 
Harmful environment that are deterred from taking the action is, 
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1
 if  
1
1
1                          if  
EBP H
H
H
H
F
p
D
p
p
ψ
ϕ π
π ϕ
ϕ π
  
  
   <
   
= −   
   

 ≥

, 
while the fraction from the Benign environment that are deterred is 
( )
( )
( )
1
 if  
1 1
1
1
1                              if  
1
BEBP
B
B
B
F
p
D
p
p
ψ
ϕ
πϕ
π
ϕ
π
  
  
   <
 − −=   − 

≥
−
. 
Note that, since 1 1
B H
p p− < < , then 
( )
1 1 1
1
B B
p pπ π π
> >
−
.  Consequently if the 
penalty is so severe that all firms from even the Benign environment are deterred then we 
will have 0 1EBP EBP EB
B H
D D D= = = .   However if 
( )
1
1
B
p
ϕ
π
<
−
it will be the case that 
0
1
EBP EBP EB
B H
D D D< ≤ ≤ .     
Whatever the penalty regime, welfare in this case is given by: 
( )( ) ( )(1 ) 1 1EBP EBP EBPB B H HW D h D hγ γ= − − − − − .   (9) 
The first term gives the welfare arising from those firms from the Benign 
environment who take the action, while the second term is the analogous expression for 
firms from the Harmful environment.  
If the CA can choose the penalty, it will want to ensure that NONE of the firms 
from the Benign environment are deterred, whereas ALL those from the harmful 
environment are deterred, and it can achieve this by setting a purely proportional penalty 
1
ˆ ˆ, 0
EBP EBP
H
p
ϕ ψ
π
= = ,   (10) 
giving rise to welfare: 
   ( )ˆ (1 ) 0EBP BW hγ= − − > .    (11) 
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4.1.3 Complete Legal Uncertainty 
Once again, no firm knows for sure whether their action will be allowed or 
disallowed, so there is legal uncertainty. But, in this case, firms do not even know their 
type, so all firms anticipate the same probability ( )(1 ) 1H B Hp p p pγ γ= + − − <  of 
having their action disallowed if investigated.  Accordingly the same fraction of firms  
  
1
 if  
1
1
1                          if  
EBC
F
p
D
p
p
ψ
ϕ
πϕ
π
ϕ
π
  
  
   <
  −=    

≥

 
 from each environment will be deterred from taking the action.  If 
1
p
ϕ
π
<  so the 
penalty is sufficiently low that some firms do indeed take the action, then we will have 
1
EBP EBC EBP
B H
D D D< < ≤ .   
For any given penalty regime welfare is  
( )1
EBC
EBC EBC
W D W= −    (12) 
where 
    ( )(1 )
EBC
B H
W h h hγ γ= − − − = −   (13) 
is the average welfare generated by those firms which take the action when there is 
Complete Legal Uncertainty.   
In considering the implications for the penalty that would be chosen by the CA, 
and the associated level of welfare, two cases arise:  
Case 1.  Action is Presumptively Legal ( )0 0EBCh W< ⇒ >  
Here the authority would want to allow all actions and to do this would set a penalty 
    $ ˆ0, 0
EBC
EBC
PL
ϕ ψ= =     (14) 
giving rise to welfare: 
    µ 0
EBC
PLW h= − >     (15) 
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Case 2.   Action is Presumptively Illegal ( )0 0EBCh W> ⇒ <  
In this case, the CA will want to deter all firms from taking the action in which case  
    $
1
ˆ, 0
EBC
EBC
PI
p
ϕ ψ
π
= =    (16) 
and the associated level of welfare is: 
     µ 0
EBC
PIW = .    (17) 
Taking the two cases together we see that, when the CA can set the penalty, welfare 
under an Effects-Based legal standard when there is Complete Legal Uncertainty is 
  µ { },0
EBC
W MAX h= − .   .  (18) 
 
4.2 Per Se Procedure 
In this sub-section we assume that the CA uses a Per Se procedure whereby all 
actions will be either allowed by the CA if the action is Presumptively Legal or, if the 
action is Presumptively Illegal will certainly be disallowed (albeit with a delay) if the 
action is investigated by the CA. This is common knowledge so there is no legal 
uncertainty when such a legal standard is used.  To understand the implications consider 
in turn two cases. 
4.2.1 Presumptively Legal Actions ( )0h <  
In this case all firms take the action whatever the penalty and the associated level of 
maximum welfare is 
    ˆ 0
PSL
W h= − > .    (19) 
Since penalties are irrelevant they can effectively be set to zero, so: 
    
 
ϕ
PSL
= 0, ψˆ PSL = 0      (20) 
 
4.2.2 Presumptively Illegal Actions ( )0h >  
In this case all firms know that, if they are investigated their actions will certainly be 
penalised.  Consequently the same fraction of firms from both the Harmful and Benign 
environments will be deterred, namely   
24 
 
0
1
      if  
1
1
1                            if  
PSI EB
F
D D
ψ
ϕ
πϕ
π
ϕ
π
  
  
<  
  −= =
 

≥
.  (21) 
Welfare for any given penalty is therefore: 
   ( ) ( )01 1 0PSI PSI EBW D h D h= − − = − − ≤ .  (22) 
If the CA can choose the penalty it will want to deter all actions and so will set a penalty 
   0
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ, 0
PSI EB PSIϕ ϕ ψ
π
= = =   ,  (23) 
giving rise to welfare 
      W

PSI
= 0 .    (24) 
So, in general, when the CA can choose the penalty, welfare under a Per Se procedure is  
    µ { },0
PS
W MAX h= − .    (25) 
  
5. Welfare Comparisons and Optimal Penalties: Main Results 
In this section we compare welfare under different procedures and information 
structures.  We start with the case where penalties are fixed and the same across regimes.  
 
5.1 Exogenous Penalties 
Given that under Per Se there is no legal uncertainty, we begin by comparing the 
outcomes between Per Se and Effects-Based legal standards when under the latter there is 
the same information structure, No Legal Uncertainty; and then we compare the 
outcomes when there is the same legal standard, Effects-Based, but different information 
structures. 
 
5.1.1 No Legal Uncertainty:  Effects-Based vs Per Se 
We have the following result: 
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Proposition 1 If there is No Legal Uncertainty then an Effects-Based legal standard 
welfare dominates a Per Se legal standard. 
Proof: Since 0EB PSID D=  it follows from (6), (19) and (22) , and from (1) and (2) that: 
  ( ) ( ){ }0 0 (1 ) 1 0EB PSI EB B B H HW W D h p h pγ γ− = − − − − >  
and 
  ( )( ){ }0 0 (1 ) 1 0EB PSL EB H H B BW W D h p h pγ γ− = − − − − > . 
The intuition is straightforward.  Given our Assumption 1 that the Effects-Based rule 
has lower decision-error costs (so equations (1) and (2) hold), the average welfare of all 
the firms who know for sure that their action will be allowed is positive.  Since, under 
this rule, all of these firms take the action, this welfare dominates a Per Se Illegal rule 
since, under that rule, some of these firms will be deterred from taking the action while of 
those who are not deterred a fraction will be investigated and have their action 
disallowed.  On the other hand, again given that (1) and (2) hold, the average welfare of 
all the firms who know for sure that their action will be disallowed is negative under the 
Effects-Based rule. So, with such a rule some of these firms will be deterred from taking 
the action and for those who are not deterred some might have their action stopped.  
However, under a Per Se Legal rule all these firms generating negative welfare take the 
action.  So if there is No Legal Uncertainty then it is better to have the discriminatory 
power of an Effects-Based legal standard.  
 
5.1.2 The Effect of Legal Uncertainty: Partial Legal Uncertainty vs No Legal 
Uncertainty 
Throughout this sub-section we will assume an Effects-Based legal standard.  
From (6) and (9) we have 
      
( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ){ }
0
0
(1 )
(1 ) 1
(1 ) 1
EBP EB EBP EBP
H B B
EBP
H B B H H
EB EBP
H H H B B
W W D D h
D h p h p
D D h p h p
γ
γ γ
γ γ
− = − − −
− − − − −
− − − − − −
  (27) 
Recall that 0EB EBP EBP
H B
D D D≥ ≥  where the two inequalities are strict if, under Partial 
Legal Uncertainty some firms from the harmful environment take the action, and that, 
from (1) and (2)  the two terms in curly brackets on RHS of (27) are positive.   
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The interpretation of this expression is as follows.  The first term shows that 
welfare under Partial Legal Uncertainty may be higher than that under No Legal 
Uncertainty because of what we called in Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009) the differential 
deterrence effect – the fraction of Benign actions that are deterred is lower than the 
fraction of Harmful actions that are deterred – an effect not present under No Legal 
Uncertainty.   The second effect reflects the fact that a fraction of those firms whose 
actions would be allowed for sure under No Legal Uncertainty will be deterred from 
taking the action under Partial Legal Uncertainty, and since, on average, the welfare 
generated by these firms is positive, this is a factor that makes welfare lower under 
Partial Legal Uncertainty.  The third term reflects the fact that for those firms whose 
actions will be disallowed for sure under No Legal Uncertainty a smaller fraction may be 
deterred under Partial Legal Uncertainty.  Since, on average, the welfare generated by 
these firms is negative, this is another factor making welfare lower under Partial Legal 
Uncertainty.   
The overall welfare difference depends on the balance of these three effects, but 
there are certainly circumstances under which the first dominates the other two.  For 
example, this would arise if the Effects-Based rule was only barely good enough to 
Effectively Discriminate – so the second term on RHS of (27) was close to zero – while, 
if the penalty was so large that all the firms from the Harmful environment were deterred, 
while some from the Benign environment took the action, then we would have 
0
1
EB EBP EBP
H B
D D D= = >  and the third term on RHS of (27) would be zero while first 
would be positive.   So we have established:  
Proposition 2 Welfare can be higher under Partial Legal Uncertainty than under No 
Legal Uncertainty.   
From Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we can establish the following:  
Corollary  2 
(a) If Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates No Legal Uncertainty then a  
fortiori  it  welfare dominates Per Se. 
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(b) Even if welfare is lower under Partial Legal Uncertainty than under No Legal 
Uncertainty it may still be higher than under Per Se
46
.   
 
5.1.3 The Effect of Legal Uncertainty: Complete Legal Uncertainty vs Partial Legal 
Uncertainty 
From (9), (12) and (13) we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) 0EBP EBC EBC EBP EBP EBCB B H HW W D D h D D hγ γ− = − − − + − ≥  (28) 
Note that EBP EBC EBP
H B
D D D≥ ≥  with strict inequalities if some firms take the action 
under Complete Legal Uncertainty.  Hence both terms on the RHS of (28) are non-
negative:  the first because, compared to Partial Legal Uncertainty, Complete Legal 
Uncertainty deters at least as many Benign actions and the second because it deters no 
more Harmful actions.  So we have proved: 
 
Proposition 3 Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates Complete Legal Uncertainty 
 
5.1.4 The Effect of Legal Uncertainty: Complete Legal Uncertainty vs No Legal 
Uncertainty 
From (6), (12) and (13) we get: 
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ){ }
0
0
(1 ) 1
(1 ) 1 0
EBC EB EBC
B B H H
EB EBC
H H B B
W W D h p h p
D D h p h p
γ γ
γ γ
− = − − − − −
− − − − − − <
 (29) 
where, 0EB EBCD D≥ .   The two terms on RHS of (29) are just the analogues of the second 
and third terms that appear on RHS of (27), and so have the same interpretation.  Since 
there is no offsetting differential deterrence effect we can unambiguously sign the 
welfare difference and so we have established:  
 
Proposition 4  No Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates Complete Legal Uncertainty. 
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 See Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009) for an extensive analysis and discussion of the conditions under which 
an Effects-Based legal standard with Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates Per Se. 
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 Notice that following the discussion of the conditions under which Partial Legal 
Uncertainty may welfare dominate No Legal Uncertainty there are analogous conditions 
under which the first term on the RHS of (29) may be extremely small and the second 
zero so that welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty is very close to that under No 
Legal Uncertainty.  Since, from Proposition 1, an Effects-Based legal standard with No 
Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates Per Se we have: 
Corollary 4 Although an information structure in which there is Complete Legal 
Uncertainty is the worst information structure for an Effects-Based legal standard, there 
are conditions under which it welfare dominates the outcome under a Per Se legal 
standard.  This result is strengthened with endogenous penalties.  
 
5.2 Endogenous Penalties 
 
In this sub-section we first compare the levels of welfare if penalties are no longer 
fixed but can be chosen by the CA so as to best achieve its objective given the legal 
standard and information structure.   We then compare the associated levels of optimal 
penalty across both legal standards and information structures.  
Before undertaking these comparisons we note that in a First-Best world with costless 
perfect information, the CA would be able to investigate all actions, accurately and 
distinguish Harmful and Benign actions; instantly disallow the former while allowing the 
latter.  All Harmful actions would therefore be deterred and all Benign actions allowed 
generating a First-Best welfare level  
( )(1 )FB BW hγ= − − .       (30) 
Turning to the second-best world comparisons we will, for the sake of efficiency in 
presenting the results, show that the worst information structure under an Effects-Based 
standard is equivalent to  Per Se, thus establishing that  Per Se is never better than 
Effects-Based. 
 
5.2.1  Welfare Comparisons 
The following inequalities follow immediately from (8), (11), (18), (25) and (30):  
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( ) ( )
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(1 )
(1 ) 1
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EB
B B H H
EBC
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W h
W
W h p h p
W MAX h
W
γ
γ γ
= − −
=
> = − − − −
> = −
=
   (31) 
This establishes the following: 
Proposition 5 When the CA can choose the appropriate penalty then there is a clear 
welfare ranking of information structures and legal standards.  In particular: 
(a)  With an Effects-Based legal standard Partial Legal Uncertainty strictly 
dominates No Legal Uncertainty
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 which in turn dominates Complete Legal 
Uncertainty.  
(b) An Effects-Based legal standard with Complete Legal Uncertainty is welfare 
welfare equivalent to a Per Se legal standard. Given (a) this implies that Per 
Se never welfare dominates an Effects-Based legal standard. 
 
We comment further on these findings. 
Partial Legal Uncertainty is equivalent to First Best.  When there is Partial Legal 
Uncertainty the CA exploits the fact that firms know their type and the fact that, since its 
rule has discriminatory ability, fewer firms from the Benign environment will be 
convicted than from the Harmful environment, to set a penalty that ensures no Harmful 
actions are taken while all Benign actions are taken.    
Partial Legal Uncertainty Strictly Dominates No Legal Uncertainty There are two 
reasons why this result holds.  First, with Partial Legal Uncertainty all Harmful actions 
are deterred, whereas, under No Legal Uncertainty, some firms from the Harmful 
environment will take the action knowing for sure that, given the CA’s imperfect model, 
they will not be convicted. Second, under No Legal Uncertainty, the penalty will be set to 
deter all actions that are on average deemed to be harmful, and some of these will be 
genuinely Benign which would not have been deterred under Partial Legal Uncertainty.    
No Legal Uncertainty Strictly Dominates Complete Legal Uncertainty.  There are 
two cases to consider.  The first is where the action is Presumptively Illegal and so, under 
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 Thus, with endogenous penalties, Proposition 2 is substantially strengthened. 
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Complete Legal Uncertainty,  the CA would set a high penalty that deters all firms from 
taking the action, generating zero welfare.  But then No Legal Uncertainty generates 
higher welfare since those firms that know for sure that their action will be allowed will 
take it and, given the assumption that the CA can effectively discriminate,  on average 
these actions generate positive welfare.  The second case is where the action is 
Presumptively Legal and so, under Complete Legal Uncertainty, the CA will set a zero 
penalty and so deter no actions. But  then No Legal Uncertainty generates higher welfare 
since those firms who know for sure their action will be deemed harmful will be deterred 
from taking it, and, given the assumption that the CA can effectively discriminate, on 
average these actions are indeed harmful, and welfare is higher by deterring them.   
Effects-Based Standards with Complete Legal Uncertainty Equivalent to Per Se 
If the action is Presumptively Illegal then under Per Se the CA will set a penalty 
that will deter all actions – and the same is true with an Effects-Based standard with 
Complete Legal Uncertainty.  If the action is Presumptively Illegal then,  under an Effect-
Based standard with Complete Legal Uncertainty,  the CA will want to set a zero penalty 
so no actions are deterred.    
 
5.2.2  Comparison of Optimal Penalties 
From (7), (10), (14), (16), (20), and (23) we have the following inequalities: 
0 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0
PSL EBC PSI EB EBP EBC
PL PI
H
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
π π π
= = < = = < = < =   (32) 
This establishes the following: 
Proposition 6    Under an Effects-Based legal standard, the optimal penalty chosen by the 
CA will be: 
(a) higher when there is Partial Legal Uncertainty than when there is No Legal 
Uncertainty 
(b) higher still when there is Complete Legal Uncertainty and the action is 
Presumptively Illegal; 
(c) zero if there is Complete Legal Uncertainty and the action is Presumptively Legal; 
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(d) higher than under a Per Se legal standard except in the case where an action is  
Presumptively Legal and there is Complete Legal Uncertainty  in which case they 
are the same.   
Thus in situations where there is legal uncertainty the appropriate penalty may be 
higher than when there is no legal uncertainty, though there is one class of cases where 
the appropriate penalty under Complete Legal Uncertainty is indeed zero. While this 
latter result is certainly consistent with the principle of nulla poena sine lega certa as 
advocated by Dethmers and Engelen (2011) and other legal scholars, there is no general 
support for this principle. 
Remark   It is worth stressing that these results are entirely consistent with the 
Beckerian tradition on optimal penalties. As Becker (1968) had first noted the optimal 
penalty is higher when uncertainty is introduced in the form of imperfect detection. Here 
we show that if there is increased uncertainty in the form of imperfect understanding 
about how actions will be treated if investigated by a CA (the form of uncertainty that has 
preoccupied legal writings) this may raise optimal penalties – though this will not always 
be the case. As shown, this result holds also when there detection is perfect (π = 1).  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we have proposed a formalisation to the concept of “legal 
uncertainty” and have set this out in the context of competition policy, but the framework 
can apply more widely. Our approach identifies legal uncertainty purely with the 
information structure of what a firm knows about the decision that a CA would reach 
should an action that the firm has taken be investigated by the authority. As such, legal 
uncertainty is distinct from the phenomenon of decision errors made by the authority, 
which are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We 
distinguish three information structures with no legal uncertainty, partial legal uncertainty 
and complete legal uncertainty.. We compare these different information structures 
between themselves and with Per Se procedures first assuming that penalties are 
exogenous and then assuming that penalties are endogenous. 
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Our analysis offers important grounds for scepticism about arguments coming 
mainly from legal experts, that Effects-Based procedures are less attractive than Per Se 
because of the Legal Uncertainty that they entail and that, if adopted, should involve 
much lower penalties according to the legal principle of nulla poena sine lege certa. Two 
important policy lessons emerge in particular from the analysis above.  
 First, enforcement procedures involving legal uncertainty may be welfare superior 
to those without any legal uncertainty because of their better deterrence effects. This is 
most likely when legal uncertainty arises because, although firms know their type, they 
cannot predict what the Competition Authority will decide in their case. Thus a decision 
by policy makers not to adopt Effects-Based procedures cannot be based solely or even 
mainly on arguments relating to the legal uncertainty of such procedures.  
Second, the superiority of Effects-Based procedures is enhanced when 
Competition Authorities use penalties to achieve optimal deterrence effects. In that case it 
is never better to use Per Se.  Under a Per Se legal standard Competition Authorities will 
use penalties to either deter all actions or deter none
48
.    Apart from the case of Complete 
Legal Uncertainty, under an Effects-Based procedure, Competition Authorities can use 
information that either they or firms have to set finely tuned penalties that don’t deter all 
benign actions but do deter some harmful actions. So Per Se is never the preferred legal 
standard whatever the type of Legal Uncertainty – a conclusion that runs directly counter 
to that proposed by many legal experts.   
Finally, and more practically, our analysis shows that Competition Authorities 
may well be justified in raising their penalties after adopting Effects-Based procedures. 
There are many extensions that can be made to our analysis.  Some of these 
extensions are made in an accompanying discussion paper, Katsoulacos & Ulph (2011b) 
where we show that the results obtained here go through if (i) we endogenise the 
information structure that firms have by allowing them to invest resources in information 
acquisition; (ii) instead of all firms having the same information structure different firms 
may have different information structures.  
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 Depending, respectively, on whether the action is presumptively illegal or presumptively legal. 
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